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PIECING TOGETHER THE PUZZLE:
ANALYZING THE COLLISION OF THE ACA
AND ERISA
Luke Kalamas*
I. INTRODUCTION

When the United States House of Representatives finally voted to
accept the Senate's amendments to the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act (hereinafter ACA) in March of 2010, many policy makers were
celebrating its passage.1 At that point in time, the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (hereinafter ERISA) was the only federal source of
law covering employer sponsored welfare plans,2 including health care.3
The ACA sought to remedy, among other things, the inconsistencies4
involving the administration of employer sponsored health care plans.
However, since its enactment, the ACA has led to some confusion
surrounding its intersection with both ERISA and the Internal Revenue
This confusion, although beneficial for
Code (hereinafter IRC).
* Luke B. Kalamas is an associate attorney at Phillips Lytle LLP in Rochester, New York.
He graduated with a B.A. in Political Science and Legal Studies from St. John Fisher College, and a
J.D. from the State University of New York at Buffalo Law School, wehre he was president of the
Labor and Employment Relations Society and received the American Bar Association and Bureau
of National Affairs Award for Excellence in the Study of Labor Law. He is admitted to practice in
New York State, as well as the U.S. District Courts for the Western and Northern Districts of New
York. Although the views expressed in this article are his own, he would like to specifically thank
both Lise Gelernter and James A. Wooten for their constructive commentary.
1. Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Robert Pear, Obama Signs Health Care Overhaul Bill, With a
2010),
23,
TIMES
(Mar.
N.Y.
Flourish,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/24/health/policy/24health.html?_r-0.
2. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2012) (defining welfare plans as programs that provide
individuals benefits such as medical, surgical, or hospital care, disability, or vacation).
3. See, e.g., id.
4. See Linda Bergthold, ACA: Threat to Employer-Sponsored Plans? Kaiser Family
Foundation's Larry Levitt Addresses Concerns that Obamacare will Weaken your Employer2014),
(Feb.
27,
HEALTHINSURANCE.ORG
Health
Coverage,
Sponsored
https://www.healthinsurance.org/blog/2014/02/27/aca-threat-to-employer-sponsored-plans/.
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employee benefits attorneys who are compensated by the hour, may
ultimately result in the very thing the ACA sought to remedy:
inconsistency.
This paper focuses on addressing the ACA's intersection with
ERISA. Due to ERISA's strong preemption provision, for decades it has
stood alone regulating employer sponsored health care plans. 5 I argue
that although the ACA sought to add uniformity to the world of
employer sponsored health care plans, it may have created some
confusion as a byproduct. I further argue, however, that some of the
ACA's changes will bring much needed reform to employer sponsored
health care plans, specifically the new reporting and disclosure
requirements. Finally, I argue that although the future of ERISA, the
ACA, and the regulation of employer sponsored health care plans seems
somewhat uncertain, we have seen an important shift regarding our
nation's policy surrounding employment and health care.
Part II of this paper will focus on the history surrounding the
regulation of employer sponsored health care plans. This section looks
at the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act (hereinafter WPPDA),
ERISA, and the ACA. Part III of this paper will focus on the collision
between ERISA and the ACA. Specifically, subsection A will address
the potential of an employer staffing down to avoid certain provisions of
the ACA. This section will lay out the employer mandate under the
ACA, discuss potential ERISA violations for employers staffing down to
avoid the ACA, and highlight additional protections added to the Fair
Labor Standards Act (hereinafter FLSA).
Subsection B will address the new reporting and disclosure
Specifically, this section will compare the ERISA
requirements.
requirements that formerly applied to all employer sponsored welfare
plans, with the new ACA requirements. Subsection C will address the
"benefits remedy" for participants or beneficiaries of employer
sponsored health care plans. Specifically, this section will compare
ERISA's civil enforcement provision for benefit denials with the new
independent external review process required by the ACA.
Finally, Part IV of this paper will focus on the future of ERISA, the
This section
ACA, and employer sponsored health care plans.
summarizes my arguments surrounding the intersection of ERISA and
the ACA and lays out my vision of what the future of employer
sponsored health care plans may look like.
5. See Brendan S. Maher, The Affordable CareAct, Remedy, and Litigation Reform, 63 AM.
U. L. REv. 649, 652 (2014).
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II. HISTORY SURROUNDING THE REGULATION OF EMPLOYER
SPONSORED HEALTH CARE PLANS

A. Welfare and PensionPlans DisclosureAct (WPPDA)
Before the enactment of the National Labor Relations Act
(hereinafter NLRA) in 1935, very few employers sponsored employee
welfare plans. 6 Employers were incentivized to provide pension plans7
for employees through the Revenue Acts in 1926 and 1928.8 However,
similar provisions for welfare plans were nonexistent. 9 After both the
enactment of the NLRA and the industrial boom following World War
II, employer sponsored welfare plans became the norm.10 In response to
the prevalence of employer sponsored pension and welfare plans, the
WPPDA was enacted in 1958.11
In terms of actually regulating welfare plans, the WPPDA did very
little. The WPPDA merely required a very limited form of reporting to
the Department of Labor (hereinafter DOL) and similarly limited
disclosure to plan participants. 2 Congress did amend the WPPDA in
1962 to grant some restricted investigatory and enforcement abilities to
the DOL, 13 however, it would be some time before a comprehensive
14
regulatory regime covered employer sponsored health care plans.
B. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
Although Congress enacted ERISA in 1974, the struggle to draft
such a complicated and comprehensive bill began over a decade
earlier. 15 The federal government was not the only regime that began
regulating employer sponsored pension and welfare plans during the

6. See History of Pension Plans, EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST. (Mar. 1998),
http://www.ebri.org/publications/facts/index.cfm?fa=O398afact.
7. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A) (2012) (defining pension plans as programs that provide
employees benefits such as retirement income).
8. COLLEEN E. MEDILL, INTRODUCTION TO EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW 3 (West, 4th ed.
2014).
9. See id.
10. Id. at 5.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See id. at 6.
15. See id. (explaining that the effort to enact a comprehensive employee benefit regulation
started in 1963).
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1950s. a6 Insurance commissioners in an increasing number of states
began to enact legislation governing certain aspects of pension and
welfare plans. 17
Additionally, courts began to recognize the
commissioners' authority to regulate employer sponsored plans. 18 For
example, in State v. Monsanto Co., the Missouri Supreme Court held
that an employer sponsored, self-insured, health care plan was not
"insurance business" and therefore was not subject to applicable state
laws regulating the business of insurance. 19
In order to promote uniformity among the states and protect
employee participants and beneficiaries, Congress began to work on
drafting and enacting a comprehensive bill that would regulate pension
and welfare benefit plans. 20 Finally, in 1973, legislation was introduced
that would eventually flourish into ERISA. 2 1 Although ERISA provided
a meaningful expansion in the regulation of pension plans, it again failed
to explicitly regulate welfare plans other than reporting and disclosure,
22
fiduciary requirements, civil remedies, and state law preemption.
Meanwhile, Congress had sought to completely regulate pension plans
by providing for minimum vesting, benefit accrual, funding, and
eligibility standards. 23 Other than some minor amendments in 1980,24 it
would be another three decades before welfare plans would finally see
some meaningful regulation.25

16. Id. at 5.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. State ex rel. Farmer v. Monsanto Co., 517 S.W.2d 129, 131-32 (Mo. 1974).
20. MEDILL, supra note 8, at 6.
21. Id.
22. See id. at 71-72.
23. See id. at 6.
24. In 1986, Congress, through the passage of COBRA, amended ERISA to provide limited
continuation of group health care coverage for terminated employees. COBRA ContinuationHealth
Coverage, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/faqs/faq-compliance-cobra.html (last
visited Apr. 12, 2016).
25. See Health Care Arrangements Established by State and Local Governments for NonGovernmental
Employees,
U.S.
DEP'T
OF
LABOR,
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/regs/unifiedagendalebsafal12009/1210-AB34fs.html (last visited Apr. 9,
2016).
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C. PatientProtectionand Affordable Care Act (ACA)
President Obama ran in 2008 on a promise to bring comprehensive
reform to health care in the United States.26 Although most of his
speeches on the subject revolved around affordability, when the ACA
was finally enacted in 2010 it brought a breath of fresh air to the
regulation of welfare plans. The ACA, being a federal statute, was able
to regulate welfare plans in a way the states never could, due to ERISA's
broad preemption provision. 27
There were, however, some problems with the passage of the
ACA.28 Due to the beast that is the political process, the idea for health
care reform went in neat and concise, only to come out with the
appearance of "Frankenstein's monster." Backroom deals such as the
"Louisiana Purchase"2 9 and the "Cornhusker Kickback ' 30 also plagued
its passage. However, in the end the bill was passed on March 21, 2010
and signed into law two days later.3 1
The main reforms to the regulation of welfare plans brought on by
the ACA involve the new and progressive reporting and disclosure
requirements and the new benefits remedy. 32 While these reforms were
much needed, there are other provisions of the ACA that may collide
with ERISA as well, such as the employer mandate and regulation of
26. See
Obama
Spells
out
Plans
for
Change,
CNN,
http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/08/29/obama.promises/index.html?iref-=mpstoryview
(last
visited Apr. 9, 2016).
27. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2012) (stating that ERISA "shall supersede any and all State laws
insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan ... ").
28. See Avik S.A. Roy, The New LouisianaPurchase:Obamacare's$4.3 Billion Boondoggle,
THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 6, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/03/the-newlouisiana-purchase-obamacares-43-billion-boondoggle/254003/.
29. Id. The "Louisiana Purchase" in this context refers to a specific provision in the Senate
version of the ACA that was added to get the vote of Senator Mary Landrieu. Id. The provision
gave $200 million in additional federal subsidies to Louisiana's Medicaid program. Id.
30. Jordan Fabian, Obama HealthcarePlan Nixes Ben Nelson's 'CornhuskerKickback' Deal,
THE HILL (Feb. 22, 2010), http://thehill.comlblogs/blog-briefing-room/news/82621-obamahealthcare-plan-nixes-ben-nelsons-comhusker-kickback-deal. The "Cornhusker Kickback" in this
context refers to a specific provision in the Senate version of the ACA that was added to get the vote
of Senator Ben Nelson. Id. This provision guaranteed that the federal government would pay, until
the end of time, any additional costs to the State of Nebraska created by the expansion in Medicaid
coverage. Id.
31. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010).
32. Penny Wofford, ACA Reporting Requirements: Tips for What's Ahead in 2016, SOCIETY
FOR

HuMAN

RESOURCE

MANAGEMENT

(Oct.

1,

2015),

http://www.shrm.org/hrdisciplines/benefits/articles/pages/aca-reportingtips.aspx#sthash.rebOuZOO.dpuf
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self-insured welfare plans. For the remainder of this paper I will analyze
each of the abovementioned provisions of both the ACA and ERISA and
discuss their potential points of collision.
III. THE COLLISION

OF

ERISA

AND THE

ACA

A. Staffing Down to Avoid the Employer Mandate
The first area of potential collision between ERISA and the ACA is
the "employer mandate" and ERISA section 510.33 While this potential
collision takes some imagination, it is not the product of far-fetched
hypotheticals. Under the ACA, the employer mandate (which will be
discussed in full detail in the sections below) only applies to employers
with a certain number of full-time employees. 34 Therefore, the knee-jerk
reaction for an employer on the border may be to reduce this number, or
"staff down." However, ERISA section 510 protects employees from,
among other things, employer actions that interfere with their attaining
rights under a benefit plan.35 This is the basic argument: an employer's
decision to staff down, in order to avoid the employer mandate, may
expose it to liability for a violation of ERISA section 5 10 for interfering
with the employee's attainment of rights under the employer sponsored
health care plan. In order to fully develop this argument I will address
both the employer mandate under IRC section 4980H 36 and ERISA
section 5 10, in greater detail.
1. The Employer Mandate [IRC Section 4980H]
37
The ACA's employer mandate requires certain "large employers"
to offer "minimum essential coverage ' 3 8 to "full-time employees. 39

33. See 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2012). Additionally, in the body of this Article provisions of the
ACA, FLSA, IRC, and ERISA will be referred to by their statute sections, however the footnotes
will contain the corresponding United States Code sections.
34. See 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(c)(2)(A) (2012).
35. See 29 U.S.C. § 1140.
36. See 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(c)(2)(A).
37. Large employers are defined under 26 U.S.C. §4980H(c)(2)(A) as an employer who
employs, on average in a calendar year, fifty or more full-time, or full-time equivalent, employees.
Id.
38. Minimum essential coverage is defined under 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(f)(2) as coverage under
any plan that provides for more than just "excepted benefits." See 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(f)(2) (2012).
Excepted benefits, under 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg-91(c)(1)-(4), include things such as disability
income insurance, worker's compensation, long-term care insurance, insurance coverage for a
specific disease, or dental/vision insurance. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg-91(c)(l)-(4).
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Under the ACA, a full-time employee is any individual "employed on
average at least 30 hours of service per week., 40 When determining
whether an employer qualifies as large, the statute takes into account not
only actual full-time employees but full-time equivalent employees as
well. 41 Therefore, in order to calculate whether an employer meets large
employer status, you must do the following: (1) calculate the number of
actual full-time employees for a given month; (2) calculate the number
of hours worked by part-time employees, per month, and divide that
number by one hundred and twenty (to account for thirty hours per
week, for four weeks) to determine the number of full-time equivalent
employees; (3) add the number of actual employees and full-time
equivalent employees; and (4) do this for each month, add the totals
together, and divide by twelve.42 After completing this equation, if the
total is fifty or higher, then the employer meets large employer status
and is subject to the employer mandate.43
The employer mandate itself is made up of two sections. These
sections are IRC section 4980H(a),44 also known as the "play or pay
penalty," 46and IRC section 4980H(b),45 also known as the "free rider

penalty.,

a. Play or Pay Penalty [IRC Section 4980H(a)]
The play or pay portion of the employer mandate is fairly similar to
the individual mandate. IRC section 4980H(a) states:
If(1) any applicable large employer fails to offer to its full-time
employees (and their dependents) the opportunity to enroll in
minimum essential coverage under an eligible employer-sponsored

plan (as defined in section 5000A(f)(2)) for any month, and
(2) at least one-full-time employee of the applicable large employer

[qualifies and] has enrolled.., for such month in a qualified health
39. 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(c)(4)(A).
40. Id.
41. MEDILL, supra note 8, at 373-74.
42. Id. at 374.
43. See id.
44. 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(a) (2012).
45. 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(b) (2012).
46.

MEDILL, supra note 8, at 374.
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plan [offered through an Exchange] with respect to which an
applicable premium tax credit or cost-sharing reduction is allowed or
paid with respect to the employee,
then there is hereby imposed on the employer an assessable payment
equal to the product of the applicable payment amount [defined under
Section 4980H(c)(1) as 1/12 of $2,000, or $2,000 on an annual basis]
and the number of individuals47employed by the employer as full-time
employees during such month.
Essentially, the play or pay penalty requires large employers to

offer full-time employees minimum essential coverage through a
sponsored group health plan or pay a penalty (where other certain
conditions are met as well).48
IRC section 4980H(a) does, however, have some additional
complexities. For example, even though the calculation for large
employer status includes hours worked by part-time employees, the play
or pay provision only requires the employer to offer coverage to fulltime employees. 49 Additionally, in terms of triggering the penalty, the
employee applying for coverage through an exchange, and qualifying for
a premium tax credit,5 ° must be a full-time employee. 51 Also, in terms
of assessing the penalty, the statute calculates based on the total number
of full-time employees, even though it takes just one full-time
employee's activity to trigger it.5 2 More importantly, for this penalty
calculation the statute expressly states that the first thirty full-time
employees are not to be counted.53
Finally, under IRC section 4980H(a) a large employer is only
required to offer coverage to full-time employees and their dependents,
not necessarily their spouses. 5 4 Although dependent coverage does not
make up a major portion of the analysis under the play or pay provision,
it will factor in much more under the second section of the employer
mandate, the free rider penalty.55

47. 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
48. Id.
49. MEDILL, supra note 8, at 375.
50. Id. Premium tax credits under 26 U.S.C. § 36B are determined on the basis of income. 26
U.S.C. § 36B(b)(2)(B)(ii) (2012).
51. MEDILL, supranote 8, at 375.
52. Id.
53. 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(c)(2)(D) (2013).
54. MEDILL, supra note 8, at 376.

55. Id.
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b. Free Rider Penalty [IRC Section 4980H(b)]
The free rider portion of the employer mandate, unlike the play or
pay provision, deals with employers who do in fact offer full-time
employees the opportunity to enroll in an employer sponsored health
care plan. IRC section 4980H(b) states:
If(A) an applicable large employer offers to its full-time employees (and
their dependents) the opportunity to enroll in minimum essential
coverage under an eligible employer-sponsored plan (as defined in
section 5000A(f)(2)) for any month, and
(B) 1 or more full-time employees of the applicable large employer
[qualify and are] enrolledfor such month in a qualified health plan
[offered through an Exchange] with respect to which an applicable
premium tax credit or cost-sharing reduction is allowed or paid with
respect to the employee,

then there is hereby imposed on the employer an assessable payment
equal to the product of the number of full-time employees of the
applicable large employer described in subparagraph (B) for such
month and an amount equal to 1/12 of $3,000 [or $3,000 on an annual
basis]. 56
The free rider provision of the employer mandate seeks to ensure
that employers offer enrollment in sponsored health care plans that is in
fact affordable. 5 7 If an employer were to offer coverage to full-time
employees (meeting the "play or pay" provision requirements) at an
unaffordable price, and the employee would fare better purchasing
coverage through the exchange system utilizing a premium tax 58credit,
then the employer would be "free riding" on the exchange system.
The key to IRC section 4980H(b) is the full-time employee's
eligibility for a premium assistance tax credit, notwithstanding the
employer offering coverage. The free rider provision's penalty is
triggered only when a full-time employee acquires coverage through an
exchange and qualifies for a premium assistance tax credit.5 9 Under
56. 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(b)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
57. See MEDILL, supranote 8, at 378.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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IRC § 36B(c)(2)(C)(i)-(ii), an employee who is offered coverage under
an employer sponsored health care plan, but decides to purchase
coverage on an exchange system,
is not eligible for a premium assistance tax credit if: (1) the employer's
plan has an actuarial minimum value of at least 60% (as measured by
federal regulations); and (2) the employee's share of the premium for
self-only coverage under the emplo er's plan does not exceed 9.5% of
the employee's householdincome.

Additionally, the affordability of the plan only relates to the
employee coverage, not dependent coverage.6 1
Finally, the actual penalty associated with IRC section 4980H(b) is
limited.62 A free rider penalty is limited to the maximum play or pay
penalty and includes a reduction for the first thirty full-time employees
as well.63
2. Interference with Protected Rights [ERISA Section 510]
ERISA section 510 was initially designed by Congress to protect
employee's rights under the new vesting and benefit accrual rules. 64 As
the Sixth Circuit stated in West v. Butler, "[t]he legislative history
reveals that the prohibitions were aimed primarily at preventing
unscrupulous employers from discharging or harassing their employees
in order to keep them from obtaining vested pension rights. 6 5 However,
section 510 protects an employee's rights connected to welfare benefit
plans as well.66
ERISA section 510 offers several key protections. As the Seventh
Circuit described in Teumer v. GeneralMotors Corp.:
Section 510 protects workers against several distinct abuses: the
disruption of employment privileges to prevent (i.e. interfere with) the
vesting or enjoyment of benefit rights-the wrong alleged in this case;
the disruption of employment privileges to punish (i.e. retaliate for) the
exercise of benefit rights; and the disruption of employment privileges
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. (citing 26 U.S.C. § 36B(c)(2)(C)(i)-(ii) (2012)).
Id. at 379 (citing 26 C.F.R. § 1.36B-2(c)(3)(v)(A)(2) (2014)).
Id. (citing 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(c)(2)(D)(i)).
26 U.S.C. § 4980H(c)(2)(D)(i).
64. MEDILL, supra note 8, at 734.
65. West v. Butler, 621 F.2d 240, 245 (6th Cir. 1980).
66. See Inter-Modal Rail Emps. Ass'n v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 U.S. 510,
514-15 (1997).
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to prevent or punish the giving of testimony in any proceeding relating
to ERISA or a sister act.
The relevant protection that I will address in this paper is "the
disruption of employment privileges to prevent.., the vesting or
enjoyment of benefit rights" under an employee benefit plan.68 In the
sections to follow, I will address the elements of a claim under section
510 generally, discuss its application to health care plans before the
enactment of the ACA, and discuss its potential use in the current legal
climate, specifically in regards to employer staffing down to avoid the
aforementioned employer mandate.
a. Elements of Section 510
In order "to establish a violation of ERISA [s]ection 510, the
plaintiff must prove that the defendant intended acted with the specific
intent to interfere with rights protected under [s]ection 51 0.,69 While
direct evidence showing a discriminatory intent is preferred, it is often
unavailable. 70 Therefore, most circuits in the United States have
adopted the burden-shifting framework from McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v.Green,71 a seminal case for proving employment discrimination with
The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
circumstantial proof.72
framework has been articulated as follows:
First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by the preponderance of
the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination. Second, if the
plaintiff succeeds in proving the prima facie case, the burden shifts to
the defendant "to articulatesome legitimate, nondiscriminatoryreason
for the employee's rejection .. " Third, should the defendant carry
this burden, the plaintiff must then have an opportunity to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by
the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for

67. Teumer v. Gen. Motors Corp., 34 F.3d 542, 547 (7th Cir. 1994).
68. Id.
69. MEDILL, supra note 8, at 735.
70. Id.
71. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
72. See Dister v. Continental Group, Inc., 859 F.2d 1108, 1111 (2d Cir. 1988) (showing a
court applying the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to a claim under ERISA § 510);
Abigail Rubenstein, Burden-Shifting Test Alive And Well Despite 7th Circ. Slam, LAw360 (Feb. 27,

2012, 9:01 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/310354/burden-shilfting-test-alive-and-welldespite-7th-circ-slam (listing a number of circuit courts that still embrace the framework's
application).
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73

discrimination.

There are a number of important intricacies that have been
developed within the framework since 1973. First and foremost, the
plaintiff s initial burden in proving a prima facie case has been described
as by the courts as a de minimis burden. 74 At this initial stage the
give
plaintiff is required to simply establish "that the employer's actions
75
rise to an inference of discriminatory intent under [s]ection 51 o.
Additionally, if the plaintiff does meet this initial burden, the
"articulate
some
legitimate,76
burden
to
then
employer's
nondiscriminatory reason" is one of production, not persuasion.
Finally, although the defendant may have its burden of producing a
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason, the plaintiff always retains the
ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that an unlawful
discriminatory motive is the real reason.77 This persuasion takes place
in one of two ways: "either directly by persuading the court that a
discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly
by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of
credence. 78
Now that I have addressed, generally, the elements of a claim under
ERISA section 510, in the following section I will discuss its application
with respect to employer sponsored health care plans before March
7

2010.

1

b. ERISA Section 510 and Health Care Plans (Pre-ACA)
Before the enactment of the ACA in March 2010, section 510
claims concerning employer sponsored health care plans were extremely
difficult to bring in most circumstances. 80 Although the Supreme Court
73. Dister, 859 F.2d at 1111 (emphasis added) (quoting Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981)).
74.
75.

E.g., id. at 1114.
MEDILL, supra note 8, at 735.

76. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254 (discussing the plaintiff's burden of persuasion and the
defendant's burden ofproduction).
77. See id. at 256 (discussing the plaintiffs ultimate burden of persuading by a preponderance
of the evidence).
78. Id. (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804-05 (1973)).
79. As was previously discussed, the ACA was passed by Congress and signed into law by
President Obama in March 2010. See supra text accompanying note 1.
80. West v. Butler, 621 F.2d 240, 245 (6th Cir. 1980) (arising from the difficulty of bringing
these claims, the Congressional intent behind section 510 was to make bringing actions against
employers that fire or harass employees to prevent them from collecting vested rights easier to
bring).
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held, as previously mentioned, that section 510 applied to welfare
benefit plans as well as pension benefit plans,81 the Circuits were quick
to clarify this holding.82
In McGann v. H & H Music Co., the Fifth Circuit held that
although section 510 applied to welfare benefit plans, employers could
amend or rescind plan provisions, even in a clearly discriminatory
manner, so long as the plan itself contains an express termination or
amendment procedure. 83 The Court reasoned that because there are no
statutory provisions regarding vesting of welfare benefit plans, and the
plan itself contained a clause stating "[t]he [p]lan Sponsor may terminate
or amend the [p]lan at any time or terminate any benefit under the [p]lan
at any time," there was no promised benefit.84 The Court ultimately held
that without a promised benefit there could be no "right to which
[McGann] may become entitled under the plan" 85 and therefore no
deprivation of such a right. 86
Although section 5 10 claims failed to see much success in terms of
challenging or preventing health care plan amendments, they did prove
useful in challenging terminations or other employee discipline.87 Some
courts have even found per se violations of section 510.88 For example,
in Lessard v. Applied Risk Management, the Ninth Circuit held that both
an employer and successor violated section 510 when entering into a
its face, discriminated against employees on disability
contract that, on 89
or medical leave.
In Lessard, the employer entered into an agreement with a
successor for a sale of its business. 90 Part of the agreement, which
required the employer to continue funding the disability and health care
81.

Inter-Modal Rail Emps. Ass'n v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 U.S. 510,

514-15 (1996).

82. See, e.g., Lessard v. Applied Risk Mgmt., 307 F.3d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 2002); McGann
v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401,405 (5th Cir. 1991).
83. See McGann, 946 F.2d at 405 (finding that although the plan was amended to reduce
coverage for a specific treatment, AIDS, and McGann was the only individual filing claims pursuant
to such treatment, because the plan contained a termination or amendment provision there was no
"promised benefit" for which that McGann was deprived).
84. Id.; see also Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 143 (1990) (stating
"Congress viewed [section 510] as a crucial part of ERISA because, without it, employers would be
able to circumvent the provision of promised benefits.").
85. McGann, 946 F.2d at 403 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2012)).
86. Id. at 408.
87. See Lessard, 307 F.3d at 1026 (listing previous Ninth Circuit decisions to show that
section 510 claims proved useful in challenging terminations or other employee discipline).
88. Id. at 1025-26.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1022.
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plan through its termination, also required the successor to employ all
employees who were actively at work on the date of the sale, or who
were employed but absent on the sale date due to a non-medical
reason.91 The Court ultimately held that "section 510 is violated when
an employer selects for presumptive termination and denial of benefits
92
specifically those employees presently on medical or disability leave.,
The Court reasoned that
[d]efendants here would have been permitted... to transfer all former
[employees] to [the successor] subject to a reduction in benefits for all
employees; but they were not permitted to exclude a select group of
employees from immediate transfer because they were not "at work"
on the day of transfer for health-related reasons.
Additionally, some circuits have held that an employee may
articulate a claim under section 510 for being discharged on the basis of
94
his or her spouse's claim under the employer sponsored health plan.
Some circuits have also held that, in terms of a claim under section 510,
it is not necessary that the benefits under the health care plan be vested,
but only that the reason for discharge was to interfere with the
attainment of them. 95 Across the circuits the message has been loud and
clear: to be successful in bringing section 510 claims in connection with
an employer sponsored health care plan, the individual must have been
disciplined or terminated and the claim 96may not stem from an
amendment or modification of the plan itself.
c. ERISA Section 510 and Health Care Plans (Post-ACA)
After the enactment of the ACA in March 2010, the potential for
ERISA section 510 claims in connection with employer sponsored
health care plans increased immensely. 97 The ACA has not only
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1026.
93. Id.
94. E.g., Fitzgerald v. Codex Corp., 882 F.2d 586, 589-90 (1st Cit. 1989).
95. See, e.g., Seaman v. Arvida Realty Sales, 985 F.2d 543, 546 (11th Cir. 1993) ("[t]he
validity of a § 510 claim does not hinge upon whether the benefits involved are vested but upon the
purpose of the discharge.").
96. See, e.g.,
McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401, 407-08 (5th Cir. 1991); Deeming
v. Am. Standard, Inc., 905 F.2d 1124, 1127 (7th Cir. 1990); Aronson v. Servus Rubber, Div. of
Chromalloy, 730 F.2d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1984); West v. Butler, 621 F.2d 240, 245 (6th Cir. 1980).
97. See Ryan P. Moulder, How the ACA,ERISA §510, and FLSA §18C Interact, MOULDER
LAW, http://moulderlaw.com/how-the-aca-erisa-510-and-flsa- 18c-interact/ (last visited Apr. 10,
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required large employers to offer affordable coverage, it has regulated
the content of that coverage as well. 98 For example, under the ACA,
most employer sponsored health care plans, with few exceptions, 99 are
required to provide coverage for the "ten essential health benefits,"
which include: (1) ambulatory patient services; (2) emergency services;
(3) hospitalization; (4) maternity and newborn care; (5) mental health
and substance abuse disorder services; (6) prescription drug coverage;
(7) rehabilitative and habilitative services and devices; (8) laboratory
services; (9) preventive and wellness services and chronic disease
management; and (10) pediatric services, including dental and vision. 100
Moreover, "[a]s of January 1, 2014, all non-grandfathered insured group
health plans sold in the small employer market must provide the
complete range of ten essential health benefits without any lifetime or
annual limitations.101 Although this requirement does not apply to plans
with grandfathered status, 10 2 it shows just how uniform employer
sponsored health care plans will soon become.
The entrenchment of mandated uniform employer sponsored health
care plans will, according to some practitioners in the field, lead to a
new class of ERISA section 510 cases. 0 3 Specifically, it has been
recognized that employers' decisions to staff down to avoid the ACA's
employer mandate could lead to section 510 claims.10 4 In theory,
employers may elect to reduce the number of full-time employees, or
employees they have altogether, to avoid the ACA's employer
mandate."' 5 However, because reducing employee hours to avoid the
employer mandate would deny former "full-time" employees the ability
to obtain health care coverage through an employer sponsored plan,
there may be an argument that this decision was undertaken to deny

2016).
98. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(f) (2012).
99. Self-insured health care plans (where the employer uses company assets to pay for
medical costs, instead of purchasing a health insurance policy from an insurance company) and
plans sold on the large employer market (for employers with more than one hundred employees) are
exempt from this requirement. Id.
100. 42 U.S.C. §18022(b)(1) (2012).
101.

MEDILL, supra note 8, at 368 (emphasis added).

102. Id. Grandfathered status, which will be addressed more fully in the "Benefits remedy"
section of this paper, works to exempt plans from some requirements under the ACA. Id. at 371.
103. Adam C. Solander & Kara M. Maciel, Where ERISA and the Affordable CareAct Collide,
LAw360 (Dec. 5, 2013, 3:48 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/489190/where-erisa-and-the-

affordable-care-act-collide.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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benefits that the employees would have been entitled to. 106
While the potential liability of employers for electing to staff down
in order to avoid the employer mandate is uncertain, the remedies
available for a section 510 violation are not. ERISA has three main civil
remedy sections: 502(a)(1)(B); 502(a)(2); and 502(a)(3). ERISA section
502, in relevant part, states:
A civil action may be broughtby a participant or beneficiary-

(B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to
enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to
future benefits under the terms of the plan;
(2) by the Secretary, or by a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary for
appropriate relief under section [409]... ;
(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or a fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or
practice which violates any provision of this [title] or the terms of the
plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress
such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this title or terms of
the plan. 107
It has long been held that the appropriate civil remedy section to
redress a violation of section 510 is section 502(a)(3). 10 8 ERISA section
502(a)(1)(B) only applies when plaintiffs seek to redress benefit or claim
denials under a plan109 and section 502(a)(2) involves only fiduciary
breaches 11 and does not authorize individual relief"' Therefore, any
a section 510 violation must be "appropriate equitable
relief for
1 12
relief."
106. Id.
107. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)-(3) (2012) (emphasis added).
108. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 144 (1990) (quoting Mut. Life Ins. Co.
v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146 (1985)).
109. See MEDILL, supra note 8, at 613.
110. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 140, 142 (1984); 29 U.S.C. §
1132(a)(2) refers only to 29 U.S.C. § 1109, which is titled "Liability for breach of fiduciary duty."
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2); 29 U.S.C. § 1109.
111. See Russell, 473 U.S. at 142 n.9.
112. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(B).
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For quite some time plaintiffs bringing section. 510 claims were
allowed to seek reinstatement, back pay, and front pay as they were
considered appropriate equitable relief available under section
502(a)(3).' 13 However, since the Supreme Court's decision in GreatWest Life & Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson pointed to the possibility
that back pay and front pay may not be appropriate equitable relief under
section 502(a)(3), 114 courts have been reluctant to grant it. 115 The
Court's decision in Cigna Corp. v. Amara,116 however, may bring new
hope to those seeking relief for section 510 claims.
In Cigna, the Court held that although section 502(a)(1)(B) did not
authorize reformation or surcharge, section 502(a)(3) may. 117 In
reference to the remedies of reformation (altering the plan itself) and
surcharge (monetary relief for losses stemming from a breach of
fiduciary duty) granted by the trial court, the Court stated, "contrary to
the District Court's fears, the types of remedies the court entered here
fall within the scope of the term 'appropriate equitable relief' in section
502(a)(3)."' 1 8 Although this was in reference to a breach of fiduciary
duty,11 9 the expansion of equitable remedies available under section
502(a)(3) will be an important piece of any potential section 510 claims
for employers staffing down to avoid the ACA's employer mandate.
Finally, there may be one last remedy available to employees who are
faced with employer staffing down to avoid the ACA's employer
mandate. 120 However, this provision lies not in ERISA, but the FLSA.
3. Other Protections for Employees [FLSA Section 18C]
FLSA section 18C was added in conjunction with the ACA to
enforce its provisions. 121 Section 18C provides, in relevant part:

113. See Schwartz v. Gregori, 45 F.3d 1017, 1020 (6th Cir. 1995).
114. See Great-West Life& Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 218-21 (2002).
115. See, e.g., Millsap v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 368 F.3d 1246, 1260 (10th Cir. 2004)
(citing Russell, 473 U.S. at 147) (holding back pay was unavailable under section 502(a)(3)); Serpa
v. SBC Telecomms., Inc., 318 F. Supp. 2d 865, 873-74 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (citing Knudson, 534 U.S.
at 213-14) (holding front pay was unavailable under section 502(a)(3)).
116. See Cigna Corp. v. Anara, 131 S. Ct. 1866 (2011).
117.

See id. at 1878.

118. Id. at1880.
119.

See id.

120. See Moulder, supra note 97.
121. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1558, 124
Stat. 119, 261 (2010) (codified as 29 U.S.C. § 218c (2012)).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2016

17

Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal, Vol. 33, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 4
HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 33:241

(a) Prohibition.-No employer shall discharge or in any manner

discriminate against any employee with respect to his or her
compensation, terms, conditions, or other privileges of employment
because the employee (or an individual acting at the request of the
employee) has[](1) received a credit under section 36B of the Internal Revenue Code
1986 or a subsidy under section 1402 of this Act. 122

of

As we recall from the discussion of the free rider penalty, where a
full-time employee is eligible for and receives a premium tax credit to
purchase coverage on an exchange, the employer is potentially subject to
a penalty. 123 Therefore, it is possible to imagine a situation where a fulltime employee, who purchases coverage on an exchange receiving a
premium assistance tax credit, has his or her hours reduced, or is
terminated altogether, in order to avoid the free rider penalty. 124
Although this remedy has yet to be tested, at least on a large scale,
the statute itself refers to the specific complaint procedure to be
utilized. 125 More importantly, this remedy is in addition to any other
rights granted by statute, including ERISA section 510.126 While the
future of ERISA section 510, FLSA section 18C, and staffing down to
is uncertain, we should anticipate
avoid the ACA's employer mandate
27
1
future.
near
very
the
in
challenges
B. Reporting andDisclosure Requirements

This section of the paper will discuss the new reporting and
disclosure requirements for employer sponsored health care plans.
Reporting requirements refer to the plan's responsibility to provide
certain information to the government, 128 whereas disclosure
requirements refer to the plan's responsibility to provide information to
plan participants and beneficiaries. 129 Both pension and welfare benefit
plans are covered by some reporting and disclosure requirements,
however they are especially important for health care plans, as
122. Id. (emphasis added).
123.

See MEDILL, supra note 8, at 378.

124. See Moulder, supranote 97.
125.
126.

See 29 U.S.C. § 218c(b); see also 15 U.S.C. § 2087(b)-(d) (2012).
See 29 U.S.C. § 218c(b)(2).

127. See Moulder, supra note 97.
128. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2717, 124
Stat. 119, 135-36 (2010) (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-17(a)(2)(A) (2012)).
129. See 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(1)(B) (2012).
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transparency is vital. 130 In the sections to follow, I will discuss the new
reporting and disclosure requirements for employer sponsored group
health plans, including the new Department of Health and Human
Services (hereinafter HHS) quality of care report and minimum essential
coverage reports to the Internal Revenue Service (hereinafter IRS).
1. Disclosures to Plan Participants: ACA Section 1001 vs. ERISA
Section 104
As health care plans, like all welfare benefit plans, are subject to
constant changes and amendments, it is important that both participants
and beneficiaries understand the terms of their plan. In order to ensure
adequate transparency, ERISA section 104(b) requires, among other
things, the administrator of the plan to provide certain documents to plan
participants and beneficiaries.131
These documents include: (1)
summary plan description (hereinafter SPD); (2) summary of material
modifications (hereinafter SMM); (3) the summary
annual report
132
(hereinafter SAR); and (4) "upon request" disclosures.
Each of these documents serves a specific purpose. Both the SPD
and SMM are intended to provide participants and beneficiaries with
information such as the plan's benefits, circumstances leading to
disqualification or denial of benefits, procedures for filing a claim for
benefits, contact information of certain plan fiduciaries, and the DOL
office where they may seek help. 133 More importantly, both the SPD
and SMM must "be written in a manner calculated to be understood by
the average plan participant, and ... sufficiently accurate and
comprehensive to reasonably apprise such participants
and beneficiaries
134
of their rights and obligations under the plan."
The SAR is intended to provide a simple overview of insurance
information, if the welfare benefit plan is insured.135 Additionally, the
SAR may be distributed by electronic sources. 136
Finally, any
participant or beneficiary may request documents' from the plan
130. See id. § 1024(a)-(b); Justin Giovannelli, Kevin Lucia, & Sarah J. Dash, The Affordable
Care Act's Disclosure Rules: Can They Improve Coverage, Raise Care Quality, and Cut Costs?,
THE
COMMONWEALTH
FUND:
BLOG
(Jan.
15,
2014),
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/blog/2014/jan/insurer-transparency.
131. See29U.S.C. § 1024(b).
132. MEDILL, supra note 8, at 70-75.
133. Id. at 70-71.
134. See 29 U.S.C. §1022(a) (2012).
135. See 29 C.F.R, § 2520.104b-10(a) (2015).
136. MEDILL, supra note 8, at 73.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2016

19

Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal, Vol. 33, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 4
HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENTLAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 33:241

administrator, including "the latest updated [SPD],... contract, or other
' 137
instruments under which the plan is established or operated."
Accordingly, these documents, when requested, must be sent to the
participant or beneficiary within thirty days. 3 Finally, if the plan
administrator fails to send the requested documents within thirty days,
the courts have discretion to hold them personally liable for up to one
hundred dollars per day. 139
The aforementioned provisions are the general requirements under
ERISA that apply to all welfare benefit plans, including health care
plans. 14 However, with the enactment of the ACA, Congress set in
place new disclosure requirements that superseded some ERISA
provisions. 141 These new disclosure provisions, which will be addressed
in the following two sections, include a new time frame for notice
of
42
1
benefits.
plan
of
summary
additional
an
and
modifications
material
a. Material Modifications
Under ERISA section 104(b)(1), plan administrators were required
to send SMM's to participants of an employer sponsored group health
plan within sixty days after the modification is implemented. 143 This
disclosure requirement, although benevolent in its intention, provided
little reaction time for participants or beneficiaries. 144 For example, if a
health care plan had a large reduction in services offered, the plan
administrator would only be required to provide notice within sixty days
after the modification, leaving the beneficiaries and participants affected
no buffer.
Congress addressed this issue, however, with amendments to the
Public Health Service Act (PHSA). 145 Under these new amendments to
the PHSA, the plan administrators of employer sponsored group health
plans are now required to give notice to plan participants no later than
sixty days before a material modification. 146 This complete switch in the

137. 29 U.S.C. §1024(b)(4).
138.

MEDILL, supra note 8, at 75.

139. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(1).
140. See id. § 1024(b)(1).
141. See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2715, 124
Stat. 119, 134 (2010) (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-15 (2012)).
142. Id.; see also infra Sections III.B.l.a, III.B.1.b.
143. See 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(1)(B) (2012).
144.

See id.

145. See § 2715, 124 Stat. at 134.
146. Id.; see also 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2715(b) (2015).
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disclosure requirement for material modification will now allow an
adequate buffer for participants and beneficiaries to prepare. 147 In
addition to the new disclosure requirements for SMMs, the ACA also
brought about additional requirements, such as the HHS summary of
benefits coverage. 148
b. Summary Plan Description (SPD) and the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) Summary of Benefits and Coverage
Although the SPD requirements under ERISA section 104 are at
least somewhat comprehensive, Congress took advantage of the
enactment of the ACA to provide for additional disclosure
requirements. 149 Under ACA section 1001, in addition to the provision
regarding the SMM, plan administrators must now provide a much more
in depth summary of plan benefits and coverage, known as the HHS
summary of benefits and coverage. 150 The HHS summary must be
presented "in a culturally and linguistically appropriate manner."' 5 1
Additionally, the summary must use "terminology understandable by the
average plan enrollee....
The HHS summary itself is required to contain the following
information:
"Uniform definitions of insurance and medical terms;
• A description of the scope of coverage and any participant costsharing requirements for each category of essential health benefits or
other benefits provided under the plan;
"Exceptions, reductions and limitations in coverage;
" Provisions describing the terms and conditions for renewability and
continuation of coverage;
* Illustrations of coverage under common benefits scenarios;
147. See generally 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2715(b) (2012) (displaying the new disclosure
requirement when material modifications to group health plans occur).
148. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 2590.715-2715(a)(1).
149. See id.
150.

Id.

151.
152.

29 C.F.R. §§ 2590.715-2715(a)(5).
29 C.F.R. §§ 2590.715-2715(a)(3).
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* A statement concerning whether the plan meets the federal standard
for minimum individual coverage required for individuals beginning in
2014 under the ACA;
- A warning that the HHS summary of benefits and coverage is only an
outline and that the participant should consult the actual plan or policy
language;
- A web site address where the actual plan or policy language may be
found; and
* A contact number
that participants in the plan may call for additional
153
information.
Additionally, the HHS summary must be no more than four pages
and must be written in at least twelve-point font. 154 It is important to
remember, as well, that the HHS summary does not replace the SPD but
155
merely adds to it.
Although the ERISA disclosure requirements were fairly helpful, it
appears that the new ACA requirements will help even more so. 156 The
more information that a participant or beneficiary receives about his or
her plan, the better. This is especially so in light of the fact that SPDs
are crucial, as most plan documents are verbose and confusing to the
average individual.
2. Reporting to Federal Agencies
In addition to new disclosure requirements concerning the plan
administrator's duty to provide information to participants and
beneficiaries, the enactment of the ACA brought on new reporting
requirements, which include the HHS quality of care report15 7 and the
15 8
minimum essential coverage reports to the IRS.

153.
154.
155.

29 C.F.R. §§ 2590.715-2715(a)(2)(i)(A)-(L).
29 C.F.R. §§ 2590.715-2715(a)(3).
See 29 C.F.R. § 2520.104b-3.

156.

See Penny C. Wofford, ACA Reporting Requirements: Tips for What's Ahead in 2016,

SHRM (Oct. 1, 2015), http://www.shrm.org/hrdisciplines/benefits/articles/pages/aca-reportingtips.aspx.
157. See infra Section III.B.2.a.
158. See infra Section III.B.2.b.
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a. HHS Quality of Care Report
Under the ACA, employer sponsored group health plans are now
required to provide annual reports to the HHS. 159 All group health plans
are required to submit a quality of care report detailing whether the plan:
. Improved health outcomes through activities such as quality
reporting, case management, care coordination, and chronic disease
management;
- Implemented activities to prevent hospital readmission, improve
patient safety, and reduce medical services; and
* Implemented wellness and health promotion activities. 160
In addition to reporting this information to HHS, the plan
16 1
administrator must also make copies available to plan participants.
Additionally, non-grandfathered plans must report to HHS and make
public information regarding, among other things, the policies and
practices of paying claims, enrollment
and disenrollment information,
162
denying claims, and rating practices.
b. Minimum Essential Coverage Reports to the IRS
The final reporting requirement under the ACA is the minimal
essential coverage report. 163 Under the ACA, employers who sponsor
health care plans providing minimum essential coverage to their
employees must submit reports containing employee and plan premium
information to the IRS. 164 Additionally, the employers who sponsor
health care plans must continue to submit the cost of coverage for each
enrolled employee to the IRS. 165 Although the Treasury Department has
just initiated enforcement of these reporting requirements with complete
compliance required in 2016,166 it appears that the ACA is attempting to
add a layer to the reporting and disclosure requirements for health care

159.
160.

See 45 C.F.R. § 158.150.
Id.

161.

See 45 C.F.R. § 156.220(a)-(b).

162.
163.

Id.
See MEDILL, supra note 8, at 84.

164.
165.

Id.
Id.

166.

Id.
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plans that has yet to be seen.
C. "Benefits Remedy"
The final collision between ERISA and the ACA that this paper
focuses on is the "benefits remedy." Under ERISA, both participants
and beneficiaries of an employer sponsored health care plan had to
utilize section 502(a)(1)(B) to challenge their benefit and claims
denials. 167 However, with the enactment of the ACA, most participants
and beneficiaries now have the option to elect for an independent
external review of their benefit and claims denials.168 In the following
sections I will discuss both of these remedy provisions in full detail.
1. ERISA Section 502(a)(1)(B)
ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B) is often called the "benefits remedy"
provision, 169 as it is used by litigants to review disputes over benefit
claims under employer sponsored welfare benefit plans. 7 0 Specifically,
section 502(a)(1)(B) allows either participants or beneficiaries to bring a
civil action in order to "recover benefits due to [them] under the terms of
[their] plan, to enforce [their] rights under the terms of the plan, or' 17
to1
plan."
the
of
terms
the
under
benefits
future
to
rights
clarify [their]
There are no specific elements of a section 502(a)(1)(B) claim, as they
are based on contractual disputes. 172 However, there are some courtcreated obstacles that each plaintiff will have to jump over in order to
assert a viable cause of action.'73 These hurdles will be addressed in the
following section.

167. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 108 (1989).
168. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2719(d) (2015).
169. Brendan S. Maher, The Affordable Care Act, Remedy, and Litigation Reform, 63 AM. U.
L. REv. 649, 657 (2014) (quoting Brendan S. Maher & Peter K. Stris, ERISA & Uncertainty, 88
WASH. U. L. REv. 433, 453, n.151 (2010).
170. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2012); Peter K. Stris, ERISA Remedies, Welfare Benefits and
Bad Faith:Losing Sight of the Cathedral,26 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 387, 393 (2009).
171. 29 U.S.C. § 11 32(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added).
172. See id. § 1132.
173. See Firestone, 489 U.S. at 108 (contemplating the appropriate standard of review in
actions arising under § 1132(a)(1)); see also Diaz v. United Agric. Emp't. Welfare Benefit Plan &
Tr., 50 F.3d 1478, 1482 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that federal courts have the authority to enforce the
exhaustion doctrine and generally do so as a matter of policy).
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a. Litigating Section 502(a)(1)(B)
i. Administrative Exhaustion
The first and most problematic hurdle for plaintiffs who bring a
section 502(a)(1)(B) claim is the "administrative exhaustion"
requirement. 174 Under ERISA section 503, every employer sponsored
benefit plan, including health care plans, must provide an internal claims
procedure. 175 Section 503 states:
[i]n accordance with regulations of the Secretary, every employee
benefit plan shall(1) provide adequate notice in writing to any participant or beneficiary
whose claim for benefits under the plan has been denied, setting forth
the specific reasons for such denial, written in a manner calculated to
be understood by the participant; and
(2) afford a reasonable opportunity to any participant whose claim for
benefits has been denied for a full and fair review by the appropriate
namedfiduciary of the decision denying the claim.

Due to this provision requiring an internal appeals process, most
courts require participants and beneficiaries to exhaust their
administrative appeals before filing a section 502(a)(1)(B) claim.' 77
Although this requirement is not explicit in the statute, many courts have
deemed it necessary. 7 8 As the Ninth Circuit stated in Diaz v. United
Agricultural Employee Welfare Benefit Plan & Trust, "[a]lthough not
explicitly set out in the statute, the exhaustion doctrine is consistent with
ERISA's background, structure and legislative history.... Consequently
the federal courts have the authority to enforce the exhaustion
requirement in suits under ERISA, and as a matter of sound policy they
should usually do so." 179
174. See29U.S.C. § 1133.
175. Id.
176. Id. (emphasis added).
177. See, e.g., Kinkead v. Southwestern Bell Corp. Sickness & Accident Disability Benefit
Plan, 111 F.3d 67, 68 (8th Cir. 1997); Diaz, 50 F.3d at 1483 (citing Amato v. Bernard, 618 F.2d
559, 566-68 (9th Cir. 1980).
178. See, e.g., Wert v. Liberty Life Assur. Co. of Bos., 447 F.3d 1060, 1063 (8th Cir. 2006);
Watts v. Bellsouth Telecomm., Inc., 316 F.3d 1203, 1207 (11th Cir. 2003); Diaz, 50 F.3d at 1483
(citing Amato v. Bernard, 618 F.2d 559, 566-68 (9th Cir. 1980).
179. Diaz, 50 F.3d at 1483.
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There are, .however, several exceptions to the exhaustion
requirement that have been recognized by a number of the Circuits,
including situations in which a plan's appeal process has been
removed, 180 there is immediate danger of "life-threatening" harm,118821
pursuing the administrative appeals process would be done in futility,'
there is no meaningful access to an appeals process, 183 and the appeals
process was reasonably interpreted as optional. 184 Although these
exceptions are available, the general rule of thumb is that the individual
must have exhausted
his or her internal appeals process before filing in
85
federal court. 1
ii. Judicial Review
Once the plaintiff has met this administrative exhaustion
requirement and filed a claim under section 502(a)(1)(B), however, they
must next encounter the hurdle of judicial review.1 86 The question of
what standard to apply when reviewing a benefits claim denial first arose
in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, where the Supreme Court held
that "a denial of benefits challenged under [section] 1132(a)(1)(B) is to
be reviewed under a de novo standard unless the benefit plan gives the
administrator or fiduciary discretionaryauthorityto determine eligibility
for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan."1 87 Courts began
recognizing what is known as "Firestone language" in their ERISA plan
decisions. For example, in order to guarantee abuse of discretion
review, as opposed to de novo review, the Seventh Circuit drafted the
following "safe harbor" language for employers to implement:
"[b]enefits under this plan will be paid only if the plan administrator
1 88
decides in his discretion that the applicant is entitled to them."
This Firestone language, however, did not end the issues
concerning judicial review of benefits claims denials. The Supreme
Court again addressed the issue in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v.

180. See Lee v. Cal. Butchers' Pension Tr. Fund, 154 F.3d 1075, 1080 (9th Cir. 1998).
181. See Henderson v. Bodine Aluminum, Inc., 70 F.3d 958, 962 (8th Cir. 1995).
182. See McGraw v. Prudential Ins. Co., 137 F.3d 1253, 1264 (10th Cir. 1998).
183. See Wilczynski v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 93 F.3d 397, 403 (7th Cir. 1996).
184. See Watts, 316 F.3dat 1207.
185. See Kathryn J. Kennedy, Judicial Standard of Review in ERISA Benefit Claim Cases, 50
AM. U. L. REv. 1083, 1167 n.436 (2001).
186. See id. at 1167-68 (discussing the differing judicial standards of review in ERISA
litigation after filing a section 502(a)(1)(B) claim).
187. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Brch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989) (emphasis added).
188. See Herzberger v. Standard Ins. Co., 205 F.3d 327, 331 (7th Cir. 2000).
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Glenn, this time in reference to an implied conflict of interest where
insured plans authorized the insurance companies to determine whether
or not to pay benefits under the plan. 189 In Glenn, the Court held that
although abuse of discretion was the proper standard of review, due to
the plan's language granting discretionary authority, it is proper to take
into consideration a conflict of interest when determining whether or not
there was an abuse of discretion. 190 This was another blow to plans that
wished to retain complete discretion in their claim for benefits
determinations. Moreover, many states have since passed legislation
prohibiting health care insurance policies from containing Firestone
language, in an attempt to preserve de novo review of claims for
benefits. 191
iii. Remedies Available
Although it appears that judicial review may, in most instances,
benefit plaintiffs, there are other issues with regards to litigating section
502(a)(1)(B) claims, such as whether an adequate remedy will be
available. 192 Under section 502(a)(1)(B), courts are generally restricted
to ordering that the plan provide benefits for the participant or
beneficiary, in accordance with the terms of the plan.1 93 For health care
plans, where a plaintiff has already received the medical treatment, the
proper remedy would simply be reimbursement for out-of-pocket
may provide other limited remedies, such as
costs. 194 Finally, courts
95
1
interest.
prejudgment
Where the medical procedure or benefit has not been provided,
however, the court may only order the plan to "provide the benefit that is
due in accordance with the terms of the plan." 196 This is often the case
with employer sponsored health care plans, as they often require the plan
to "preapprove" the medical treatment. 197 Therefore, a problem that
often arises with section 502(a)(1)(B) claims for benefits under an
employer sponsored health care plan is that the participant or beneficiary
may be either deceased or no longer an appropriate candidate for the
189. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 108 (2008).
190. Id. at 115 (quoting Firestone,489 U.S. at 115).
191. MEDILL, supra note 8, at 643.
192. Id. at 649.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. See, e.g., Fritcher v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 301 F.3d 811, 819-20 (7th Cir. 2002).
196. MEDILL, supra note 8, at 649.
197. Id.
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procedure. 1 98 Finally, if the plaintiff has suffered damages due to the
original denial of benefits by the plan administrator, they are again
unable to fully recover under section
502(a)(1)(B), as it does not
199
authorize compensatory damages.
b. Additional Problems: Vesting for Health Care Plans
Finally, there are some additional problems with enforcing benefits
under health care plans. Unlike pension benefit plans, welfare benefit
plans have no statutory vesting schedule.20 ° In fact, under the "settlor
function doctrine" employers are generally authorized to modify or
completely eliminate welfare benefit plans, including health care
plans. 20 1 However, ERISA section 402(b)(3) does require every
employee benefit plan, including welfare benefit plans, to "provide a
procedure for amending such plan, and for identifying the persons who
have authority to amend the plan....
Although section 402(b)(3) requires an amendment procedure, the
courts have been more than generous in finding them, even when the
procedure is not clear. 20 3 For example, in Curtiss-Wright Corp. v.
Schoonejongen the Supreme Court held that a clause stating "'[t]he
Company reserves the right at any time and from time to time to modify
or amend, in whole or in part, any or all of the provisions of the Plan"
satisfied the requirements set out in section 402(b)(3). 20 4 In its holding
the Court recognized that section 402(b)(3) requires two specific
procedures: one for amending the plan and one for identifying someone
who is given authority to amend the plan.20 5 The Court summarily
found that the "company" was properly identified as the "someone"
authorized to amend the plan.20 6 Finally, the Court found that the
reservation clause also met the second requirement, as it held "the literal
terms of § 402(b)(3) are ultimately indifferent to the level of detail in an
amendment procedure.... The provision requires only that there be an

198.

Id.

199. See Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 144 (1985).
200. See Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 78 (1995); Am. Fed'n of Grain
Millers v. Int'l Multifoods Corp., 116 F.3d 976, 979 (1997).
201. See Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. at 78.
202.

29 U.S.C. § 1102(b)(3) (2012) (emphasis added).

203.
204.
205.
206.

See Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. at 81.
Id.at 76.
Id.at 78.
Id.at 75.
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amendment procedure, which here there is."

20 7

Schoonejongen turned out to be the seminal case for both the settlor
function doctrine and the "reservation of rights clause" amendment
procedure. 20 8 The Court's decision has made it almost impossible to
assert a vested right to benefits under an employer sponsored health care
plan .2 09 However, courts have since found vested rights to welfare plan
benefits based on contract principles, specifically that benefits vest when
a medical condition arises that is covered under the plan.21 0
Additionally, the enactment of the ACA has forced the hands of most
large employers to both offer employer sponsored health care plans and
ensure the plans contain certain benefits. 1
2. Independent External Review
The final section of this paper discusses the other "benefits
remedy," independent external review. Independent external review is
similar to another layer of internal review, except the individual
reviewing the claim denial is a third-party. 21 2 It is also somewhat similar
to arbitration in that it is the resolution of a private dispute between two
21 3
parties, in a private forum, that is much more cost effective than court.

Although external review was around before the ACA, its enactment
greatly expanded its availability. 2 14 The external review process, both
before and after the enactment of the ACA, will be discussed in the
following two sections.

207. Id. at 80.
208. Id. As of April 24, 2016, a key cite search shows that Schoonejongen has been cited in
over 645 subsequent decisions. Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73: Citing
Decisions,

LEXIS

ADVANCE,

https://advance.lexis.com/shepards/shepardspreview/?pdmfid=l 000516&crid=649431 ca-3947-4f789ecb-b07f4392a2dd&pdshepid-um%3Acontentltem%3A7XWN-0261-2NSF-C3 WP-0000000&pdshepcat=citingref&action=sheppreview&ecomp=-9pfk&prid=469e5e49-20d8-4cc7-a8c9ea80088744c3 (last visited Apr. 24, 2016).
209. Richard L. Kaplan et. al., Retirees at Risk: The Precarious
Promise ofPost-Employment Health Benefits, 9 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y, L. & ETHICS 287,

303 (2009).
210. See, e.g., Wheeler v. Dynamic Eng'g, 62 F.3d 634, 638 (4th Cir. 1995) (stating that the
court chose to interpret the ERISA plan under ordinary contract law).
211. See MEDILL, supra note 8, at 374-75.
212. Roy F. Harmon, An Assessment of New Appeals and External Review Processes- ERISA
Claimants Get "Some Kind ofA Hearing," 56 S.D. L. REv. 408, 440, 451 (2011).

213. Id. at440.
214. See id. at 423.
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a. External Review (Pre-ACA)
Since its birth, ERISA's preemption clause has been interpreted by
the courts as extremely broad.2 15 For example, in FMC Corp. v.
Holliday, the Supreme Court stated "[t]he preemption clause is
conspicuous for its breadth. It establishes as an area of exclusive federal
concern the subject of every state law that 'relate[s] to' an employee
benefit plan governed by ERISA. ' '216 For this reason, state laws that
"relate to" an employee benefit plan have been held to be preempted by
ERISA again and again; this includes alternate remedial provisions. 217
In 2002, however, the Supreme Court carved out a new exception:
the independent external review process. 21 8 In Rush PrudentialHMO,
Inc. v. Moran, the Court held that although a state-operated independent
external review process "related to" an employee benefit plan governed
by ERISA, it was nonetheless saved by ERISA's "savings clause,"
which allows states to pass statutes that regulate, among other things,
insurance.219 The Court further reasoned that the external review
process in question did not add a legal cause of action to be brought in
court, but rather provided for something similar to the internal appeals
process already mandated by ERISA section 503.22 o

After the Court's decision in Moran, more and more states began to
enact independent external review systems. 221 Although these external
review systems became somewhat popular, they did not exist in every
state.22223 Moreover, they did not apply to self-insured plans. 23 For this
reason, Congress, as it did with many other issues, took advantage of the
ACA's enactment to expand the remedy of independent external review
for benefit claims denials.224 This expansion will be addressed in the
215. See id. at 416 (stating that the Supreme Court gave ample boundaries to ERISA domain).
216. FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 58 (1990).
217. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987), wherein the Supreme Court
stated,
[t]he expectations that a federal common law of rights and obligations under ERISAregulated plans would develop, indeed, the entire comparison of ERISA's [section]
502(a) to [section] 301 of the LMRA, would make little sense if the remedies available
to ERISA participants and beneficiaries under [section] 502(a) could be supplemented or
supplanted by varying state laws.
218. See Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 386-87 (2002), overruled in part
by Ky. Ass'n of Health Plans v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329 (2003).
219. Id. at 387.
220. Id. at 386-87.
221. MEDILL, supra note 8, at 371.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
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following section.
b. External Review (Post-ACA)
In the post-ACA era, independent external review is available in
every state to all participants and beneficiaries of non-grandfathered
plans, which includes self-insured plans. 225 The specific section of the
ACA that created this expansion, section 2719, states, in relevant part:
A group health plan and a health insurance issuer offering group or
individual health insurance coverage shall implement an effective
appeals process for appeals of coverage determinations and claims,
under which the plan or insurer shall, at a minimum(4) provide an external review process for such plans and issuers that,
at a minimum, includes the consumer protections set forth in the
Uniform External Review Model Act promulgated by the National
of Insurance Commissioners and is binding on such
Association
226
plans.
Under the ACA's external review process, a plan beneficiary or
participant may elect to have an independent review organization
(hereinafter "IRO") review the plan administrator's claim denial.227
Before the individual can elect this remedy, however, he or she must
first exhaust the plan's internal appeal process, similar to the exhaustion
requirement for section 502(a)(1)(B) claims.228 Once a "final adverse
determination" has been made, the individual may file a request for an
independent external review, which must be made with the state's
insurance commissioner. 229 Under regulations promulgated by the
judgment or a
Secretary of HHS, only decisions concerning medical
23 0
rescission of coverage are reviewable by the IRO.
If a claim is reviewable by the IRO, the independent reviewer of the
claim denial must "[b]e an expert in the treatment of the covered
person's medical condition that is the subject of the external

225. Id.
226. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2719, 124 Stat. 119,
138 (2010) (emphasis added) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-19 (2012)).
227. MEDILL, supra note 8, at 372.
228. UNIF. HEALTH CARRIER EXTERNAL REVIEW MODEL ACT § 7(A) (NAT'L Ass'N OF INS.
COMM'RS 2010).
229. Id. § 8(A)(1).

230. 29 C.F.R. §§ 2590.715-2719(d)(1)(ii)(A)-(B) (2015).
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review... ,,231 During the external review, the participant may submit
additional evidence not previously considered by the plan
administrator.232 Finally, the independent reviewer, when making a
determination, reviews the plan administrator's decision de novo 233 and
234
the reviewer's determination is binding on the plan administrator.
The independent external review process is meant to be a cost
effective alternative to lengthy and often inefficient litigation. 235 Like
all remedial options, however, there are some drawbacks to the new
independent review process. For example, independent reviewers, much
like arbitrators, are not required to explain their decision making process
to the public.236 Additionally, it is unclear whether or not the external
review process is now a prerequisite to filing in federal court, or if the
external review bars a subsequent action under ERISA altogether. 237 It
may take the courts some time to flesh this problem out.
IV. FUTURE OF ERISA, THE ACA, AND REGULATION OF EMPLOYER
SPONSORED HEALTH CARE PLANS
This paper was intended to do three things. First and foremost, my
intention was to present some of the major provisions of the ACA, in
terms of their impact on longstanding ERISA sections, and address their
advantages/disadvantages. Although I was only able to briefly address it
in my paper, ERISA's broad preemption clause has led to very few
significant state and local regulations that touch employer sponsored
health care plans.238 This has led to, for the most part, a steadfast and
231.

UNIF. HEALTH CARRIER EXTERNAL REVIEW MODEL ACT § 13(B)(1).

232.

MEDILL, supra note 8, at 372.

233. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, TECHNICAL RELEASE 2010-01, INTERIM PROCEDURES FOR
FEDERAL EXTERNAL REVIEW RELATING TO INTERNAL CLAIMS AND APPEALS AND EXTERNAL
REVIEW UNDER THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT, at 5 (2010),

http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/acatechnicalrelease20l0-01 .pdf.
234.
235.

UNIF. HEALTH CARRIER EXTERNAL REVTEW MODEL ACT § 11(A).
Preserving the Integrity and Viability of Independent Medical Review, NAT'L ASS'N

INDEP. REV. ORG., at 1, http://nairo.org/site/1920nair/nairowhite-paper_042007.pdf (last visited
Mar. 7,2016).
236.

Katherine

T.

Vukadin,

NYU

REvIEw OF

EMPLOYEE

BENEFITS

& EXECUTIVE

COMPENSATION § 15.03 (Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. 2014).
237. See, e.g., Goldman v. BCBSM Foundation, 841 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1026 (E.D. Mich.
2012) ("It does not appear that the new external review process must be completed before an
individual has the right to sue under ERISA.").
238. Patricia A. Butler, ERISA Implicationsfor Employer Pay or Play Coverage Laws, CAL.
1
(Mar.
2005),
HEALTH
CARE
FOUND.,
at
http://www.chcf org/-/media/MEDIA%20LIBRARY%2OFiles/PDF/PDF%20E/PDF%20ERISAPay
Playlmplications.pdf.
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uniform federal common law in terms of litigation surrounding employer
sponsored health care plans.2 39 However, ERISA's preemption is often a
double-edged sword; it will preempt state causes of action without
providing adequate remedies under the act itself,240 as was discussed
under the section regarding section 502(a)(1)(B) remedies. 241 Therefore,
it is my opinion that expansion of the independent external review
process, although it has its drawbacks, is a step in the right direction.
Additionally, the new reporting and disclosure requirements are a
significant step in the right direction as well. The idea that participants
and beneficiaries could, prior to the ACA, have their coverage rescinded
without notice until sixty days after the fact 242 is outrageous. While both
Congress and the courts have stressed the importance of allowing
employers to amend or rescind welfare benefit plans, for the most part,
as they see fit, 243 it would seem equally important that we charge
employers and plan administrators with the duty of providing at least a
courtesy notice when eliminating benefits. Although welfare plans have
not been the subject of substantial regulation, from the WPPDA through
ERISA, they have been subject to reporting and disclosure
requirements. 244 The ACA's new provisions on reporting and disclosure
are the exact requirements we have needed.
Second, this paper was intended to address potential issues based
on employer activity, likely to occur in the face of the ACA's employer
mandate, and how that activity may implicate provisions under ERISA,
specifically section 510. Although the logic behind the argument for
liability is sound, it presupposes the employer activity. At the end of the
day, each employer's decision on whether or not to reduce staff will be
based upon a cost benefit analysis comparing potential liability under
ERISA with potential liability under the ACA.245 My guess is that this
239.

William Sage, Nothing (Still) Matters: ERISA Preemption Returns to the Supreme Court,

HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (Dec. 7, 2015), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/12/07/nothing-stillmatters-erisa-preemption-retums-to-the-supreme-court/.
240. Id.
241. See infra Section III.C.l.a.iii.
242. Summary of Benefits and Coverage and Uniform Glossary, 77 Fed. Reg. 8668, 8677 (Feb.
14, 2012) (to be codified 45 C.F.R. pt. 147).
243. Andrew M. Kramer, Evan Miller & Richard F. Shaw, Retiree Health Benefits: Legal
Developments
in
a
Changing
Global
Economy,
at
3
n.1
(2008),
http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/b862f89d-f5f8-445f-8344aa037c82b669/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/008b578a-4949-4371-b8e3f557edc34941/JD -4294925.pdf (quoting Inter-Modal Rail Emps. Ass'n v. Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 U.S. 510, 515 (1997).
244. See infra Section III.B.
245. See Kevin LaCroix, ACA Employer Mandates and Potential Liability Issues, THE D&O
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issue will arrive before the courts fairly quickly. However, similar to
many aspects of employee benefit law, it will probably take the courts a
while to fully resolve it. The ACA's employer mandate, specifically the
penalty calculation, is fairly new and still somewhat confusing.2 46 Until
its application is worked out through litigation, it is hard to say exactly
what employers will actually do in terms of staffing down.
Finally, this paper was intended to address the future of ERISA, the
ACA, and employer sponsored health care plans. Although the ACA
has been the center of partisan bickering since its enactment in 2010,247
its actual provisions seem fairly moderate. For example, the employer
mandate sets out a prescription that some critics claim will kill small
business. 248

However, the penalty provision discounts the first thirty

full-time employees, leaving many small businesses completely
unscathed.249 This paper is not meant to comment on the policy
decisions behind the ACA one way or another. The ACA's enactment
does lead me to one conclusion, however: Employers will most likely be
the primary sources of health care for individuals, for the foreseeable
future.

DIARY (Dec. 15, 2014), http://www.dandodiary.com/2014/12/articles/affordable-care-act/acaemployer-mandates-and-potential-liability-issues/.
246. See ObamacareEmployer Mandate, OBAMACARE.NET, https:/obamacare.net/obamacareemployer-mandate/ (last updated Oct. 30, 2015).
247. David Morgan, Top US. Health Adviser Wants End to Partisan Fighting Over
Obamacare,BUSINESS INSIDER (Sept. 8, 2014, 4:50 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/r-top-ushealth-adviser-wants-end-to-partisan-fighting-over-obamacare-2014-9.
248. See SEAN LOWRY & JANE GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43181, THE
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT AND SMALL BUSINESS: ECONOMIC ISSUES 11-12 (2015),
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43181 .pdf.

249.

ObamacareEmployer Mandate, supra note 246.
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